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Brain potentials and volition
Libet, Gleason, Wright, & Pearl (1983) asked participants to
report the moment at which they freely decided to initiate a
pre-specified movement, based on the position of a red
marker on a clock. Using event-related potentials (ERPs),
Libet found that the subjective feeling of deciding to
perform a voluntary action came after the onset of the motor
“readiness potential,” RP). This counterintuitive conclusion
poses a challenge for the philosophical notion of free will.
Faced with these findings, Libet (1985) proposed that
conscious volitional control might operate as a selector and
a controller of volitional processes rather than as an initiator
of them.
Methodological issue
Because Libet’s findings rely more than necessary on
introspection, we designed a more controlled task in which
participants listen to random sequences of digits presented
at (1) fixed (1-sec.) vs. (2) variable (c. 1-sec) rates, with
instructions to choose spontaneously at some point to repeat
a digit they have just heard. The conscious act is assumed to
occur somewhere between digit-onset and vocal response.
The timed-digit series replaces Libet et al’s clock and the
need to both choose and note the time of choosing.
Results and discussion
RP onset occurred earlier in the fixed rate condition.  When
averaged on the stimulus’ onset, this motor preparation
precedes the presentation of the repeated digit (hence,
presumably also the decision to respond) in the fixed rate
condition, but follows it when the timing is not predictable
(though this does not necessarily mean that RP onset does
not precede the decision to respond in both conditions).
From these two conditions alone we cannot yet ascertain
whether the observed difference is a nonspecific
premeditation effect based on the predictability of the
interstimulus interval in the fixed-rate condition or the onset
of a digit-specific decision. However, these results suggest
that it may be possible to triangulate on the instant of a
decision by systematically manipulating the task constraints
through a series of approximations from a non event-related
voluntary action to a forced-choice task, thereby controlling
for the potential artifacts, resolving some of the ambiguities,
and getting a more fine-grained chronology of conscious
decision than is possible in Libet’s original paradigm.
Figure 1: RP’s (Top panel) and ERP’s (Bottom panel) from
selected subjects in the fixed and variable rates conditions.
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